People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities.
For better or for worse, people appear to be unrealistically optimistic about themselves and their future prospects (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Irwin, 1953; Langer, 1975; MacDonald & Ross, 1999; Weinstein, 1980; Wortman, 1975) . For better, overly optimistic views about the world help to maintain a sense of control and foster psychological well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988) . Overoptimism is also believed to be a necessary condition for motivation and goal attainment (Sutcliffe, 1994; Weick, 1995) , for example, serving as a key factor in the decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Schumpeter, 1942; cf. also Thaler, 2000) . For worse, optimistic biases and overconfidence may lead to market anomalies such as overtrading or excess market entry (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2001; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998 Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Van den Steen, 2004 ).
Yet people are not always overoptimistic. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI; n.d.) is a widely acknowledged measure of the degree of optimism about the state of the economy that U.S. consumers express through their saving and spending activities. In the period from July 2007 to February 2009, the CCI fell almost continuously from 108 to 21 points, the lowest standing since its beginning in 1967. In economic recessions, rather than being overly optimistic, people seem to be realistic (or probably even overly pessimistic).
Supporting the view that people are not always overoptimistic, some researchers have argued that people might strategically overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome (Weber, 1994) , for example, as a way of protecting themselves from the intense emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize (Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000;  cf. also Risen & Gilovich, 2007) . Given the possibility that people may at times be overly optimistic and at other times be overly pessimistic, I investigated what causes people to become more optimistic or more pessimistic in their predictions. I propose that people become more optimistic in their judgments about future events when they focus on success and become more pessimistic when they focus on nonsuccess/failure. Whenever a future outcome is desirable (i.e., denotes a success) or undesirable (i.e., denotes a failure), a decision maker has a stake in the outcome. I show that because decision makers misattribute their arousal from having a stake in the outcome to the likelihood of the outcome occurring, they judge the likelihood that either a desirable or undesirable outcome will occur higher than that a neutral outcome will occur. I tested this stake-likelihood effect in four studies and conclude this article with a new interpretation of wishful thinking.
Wishful Thinking

Desirability Bias
The literature distinguishes between two types of overoptimism: wishful thinking and overconfidence. Overconfidence describes people's overoptimism with respect to their own performance (for a review, see Moore & Healy, 2008) . Wishful thinking, in contrast, denotes people's overoptimism about future events that are unrelated to their performance. Stated more precisely, wishful thinking or desirability bias occurs when "the desirability (undesirability) of an outcome leads to an increase (decrease) in the extent to which it is expected to occur" (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007, p. 96) . The bias is typically demonstrated in laboratory experiments where participants drawing cards from a deck predict whether the next draw will be a winning or losing card. The card decks typically contain 10 cards, and participants are informed about the number of marked cards in a deck. Each round they are asked to predict whether they will draw a marked or unmarked card. In the win condition, drawing a marked card results in winning money; in the lose condition, it results in losing money. After each draw, the card is put back in the deck, and the deck is shuffled for a new round. In 17 of the 20 studies reviewed in Krizan and Windschitl (2007) and in a recent study by Windschitl, Smith, Rose, and Krizan (in press) , participants predicted more drawings of winning cards than drawings of losing cards. Figure 1 displays the data from such a card-drawing experiment (Crandall, Solomon, & Kellaway, 1955) . However, does such a relative preference for predicting wins demonstrate that people are too optimistic and exhibit a desirability bias? To claim that people suffer from a bias, it has to be shown that their predictions deviate from the predictions of an accuracy-maximizing decision maker. When the objective probability of drawing a marked card is below 50% (i.e., the number of marked cards Ͻ 5), such a decision maker would always predict not drawing a marked card. As the observed frequency of predictions is greater than 0% in these cases (see Figure 1 ), participants overpredict wins (i.e., show a desirability bias) but also overpredict losses (i.e., show an undesirability bias). Likewise, in the conditions where the objective probability of drawing a marked card is greater than 50% (i.e., the number of marked cards Ͼ 5), an accuracy-maximizing decision maker would always predict drawing a marked card. As the observed frequency of predictions is less than 100% in these cases (see Figure 1 ), participants underpredict wins (an undesirability bias) but also underpredict losses (a desirability bias). Finally, when the objective probability of drawing a marked card is 50%, any prediction is possible (i.e., there is no prediction that would maximize accuracy); consequently, no bias can be inferred from observed predictions. Thus, data from the card-drawing paradigm show that, compared to normative predictions, there is evidence for a desirability bias and for an undesirability bias. There is no evidence that people are generally too optimistic.
A potential alternative explanation for the typical results of card-drawing experiments might be that participants find it too boring to follow an accuracy-maximizing strategy through all trials. For example, Crandall et al. (1955) reported that in their experiment, 6 participants strictly followed the accuracymaximizing strategy and 12 participants did so partially (total sample size was 40). Always predicting not drawing a marked card when there are fewer than five marked cards in the deck and always predicting drawing a marked card when there are more than five marked cards might simply be too boring. So, to make the task more interesting, participants might try to guess outcomes. Thus, data from card-drawing experiments might show that people enjoy predicting a win more than predicting a loss. Given that participants are typically given either no or only small monetary incentives compared to what they can win or lose, their enjoyment from predicting a win over predicting a loss might outweigh their motivation to make accurate predictions.
A slightly different form of the desirability bias is the allegiance bias-that some kind of identification or psychological investment in an outcome affects recall, outcome predictions, and evaluations. For example, Babad (1987) and Babad and Katz (1991) asked spectators in soccer stadiums to predict games' outcomes before the games. Fans demonstrated overwhelming wishful thinking in their predictions as the majority of fans of both teams predicted their team to win. Outcome predictions were positively correlated with self-defined levels of fanhood and team preference. However, the allegiance bias has been called into question as fans might become supporters of their teams because they believe them to be better than other teams. It is therefore not clear whether overpredicting victories of the favorite team is evidence for the allegiance bias or a manifestation of the self-selection process (Fisher & Budescu, 1995; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) .
More important, as in the card-drawing paradigm, outcome predictions in the allegiance paradigm need to be contrasted with predictions based on objective probabilities. For example, suppose that 75% of Obama supporters and 35% of McCain supporters predicted in October 2008 that Barack Obama would become president of the United States. Whether Obama supporters were overly optimistic or overly pessimistic depends on the objective probability of Obama becoming president. If it had been below 50%, Obama supporters would have been too optimistic; had it been above 50%, they would have been too pessimistic (the argument holds vice versa for McCain supporters). As the objective probabilities for events such as elections or sports games are Figure 1 . Percentage of trials on which the marked card was predicted as a function of the frequency of the marked card (out of 10) and whether the drawing of a marked card was desirable (winning points), neutral, or undesirable (losing points). From "Expectancy Statements and Decision Times as Functions of Objective Probabilities and Reinforcement Values," by V. J. Crandall, D. Solomon, and R. Kellaway, 1955, Journal of Personality, 24, p. 197. Copyright by Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted with permission. typically unknowable, 1 it is impossible to determine which bias is manifest.
Last, studies that used subjective probabilities as dependent variables (how likely is Event X to occur?) instead of using outcome predictions (such as predicting the type of card drawn next or whether Obama or McCain would become president) have consistently failed to find differences in likelihood judgments for desirable and undesirable outcomes (for a review of these studies, see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; cf. also Bar-Hillel, Budescu, & Amar, 2008) .
To summarize, there is no evidence that people generally overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict undesirable outcomes. Studies that use outcome predictions do not provide consistent evidence for a desirability bias (card-drawing paradigm) or cannot determine which bias is manifest because objective probabilities for real-world events are unknowable. Studies that use subjective probabilities have consistently failed to find evidence for a desirability bias.
Undesirability Bias
Interestingly, other researchers have argued that people might at times be overpessimistic in their likelihood judgments. For example, Weber (1994) suggested that underestimating the likelihood of negative events can be more costly than overestimating their likelihood. As unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) , people might strategically overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome as a way of protecting themselves from the intense emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize. Shepperd et al. (2000) showed that such bracing for loss or strategic pessimism increases likelihood judgments of negative but not of positive outcomes (cf. Golub, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009) . Similarly, Risen and Gilovich (2007) demonstrated that participants judged a lottery ticket to be more likely to win the more aversive the outcome was (e.g., an enemy instead of the participant would get the payoff). However, rather than attributing this finding to strategic pessimism, Risen and Gilovich provided evidence that this effect occurred because the act of imagining an exchanged ticket winning the lottery increased the belief that such an event was likely to occur.
Optimism and Pessimism in Subjective Probabilities
Given the possibility that people may at times be overly optimistic and at other times be overly pessimistic, I investigated what causes people to become more optimistic or more pessimistic in their predictions. Whenever a future outcome is desirable (i.e., denotes a success) or undesirable (denotes a failure), a decision maker has a stake in the outcome that causes arousal. Arousal is hypothesized to be misattributed to likelihoods, thereby making people more optimistic and more pessimistic depending on what outcome, success or failure, they focus on.
Misattribution of Arousal
In a probabilistic decision situation, the stake influences how aroused the stakeholder is. Positively/negatively incentivizing participants for good/bad performance is a standard manipulation of arousal in the motor performance literature (Neiss, 1988) . For example, Elliot (1964) showed that, as compared to a control condition, monetary incentives in motor performance tasks increased electroencephalographic activity (EEG), electromyographic (EMG) activity, palmar conductance, and heart rate. Likewise, Eason and Branks (1963) showed higher EMG levels for participants who were rewarded with grade points for good performance on verbal and motor tasks. Similarly, negative performance incentives, such as avoiding aversive noise or electric shocks that are administered to the performer or an unrelated person, have been shown to increase systolic and diastolic blood pressure, heart rate, pulse rate, plasma epinephrine, galvanic skin responses, and EMG (Contrada et al., 1982; Geer & Jarmecky, 1973; Schnore, 1959) . These findings suggest that both positive and negative stakes in an uncertain outcome increase arousal.
Misattribution of arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962) or excitation transfer (Zillmann, 1971 ) posits that an individual who has been aroused in Situation A might misattribute residual arousal in a subsequent Situation B to the stimuli of Situation B rather than the stimuli of Situation A. For example, physical exercise has been shown to increase male participants' judgment of attractiveness of, liking for, and romantic attraction toward an attractive woman and to decrease those judgments when the woman was unattractive (Dutton & Aron, 1974; White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981) . Misattribution of arousal has been demonstrated for a broad range of emotional states and judgments such as fear, anger, aggression, negative mood, dysphoric empathy, sexual excitation, attractiveness and liking, appreciation of music, judgments of funniness of cartoons (for an overview of these findings, see Reisenzein, 1983) , and recently judgments of heights (Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009) .
All these judgments are difficult to make since human perception and reasoning do not provide objective criteria that allow determination of the precise level of emotions, attractiveness, or even heights. In the face of such ambiguity, the feelings-asinformation hypothesis by Schwarz and Clore (1983) states that judgments are made on the basis of how a decision maker feels about the object in question. Arousal can be one of these feelings, as is evidenced by the many arousal misattribution findings cited above. I argue that, just as arousal from another source can be misattributed to judgments of attractiveness or heights, the arousal from having a stake in the outcome may be misattributed to the likelihood of an event's occurrence. 1 One might argue that polls and prediction markets allow for accurate probability estimates of elections. However, even one of the most successful prediction markets, the Iowa Electronic Market (http://www.biz .uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm), got the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in 2000 wrong, incorrectly predicting a win by Al Gore over George W. Bush. So, according to the Iowa prediction market, people who predicted Al Gore would win would not have suffered from a desirability bias because the probability of Gore winning was above 50%. The question is, What was the objective probability of Al Gore winning in 2000? Was it above 50%, as the Iowa prediction market suggested, and it just happened that the less likely of the two outcomes materialized? Or was it below 50%, suggesting that people who predicted Al Gore would win suffered from a desirability bias? The point is that, even if one has very good predictions of future outcomes, the objective probability of such events is unknowable.
The Stake-Likelihood Effect
When decision makers are asked to judge how likely an event is to occur, such as the likelihood that they will win a blackjack game, they may attribute their arousal from having a stake in the game to the likelihood of winning the game. Importantly, arousal may be attributed not only to the likelihood of success but also to the likelihood of failure. Aroused decision makers may judge the likelihood of winning the game or the likelihood of losing the game to be higher than nonaroused decision makers do. Thus, a decision maker may become more optimistic or more pessimistic in a given situation depending on whether she or he is asked to judge the likelihood of winning or losing the game. I call this the stake-likelihood effect.
The stake-likelihood effect is consistent with Krizan and Windschitl's (2007) conclusion that in research utilizing games of chance, subjective probabilities are insensitive to outcome desirability. According to the stake-likelihood effect, subjective probabilities are affected by outcome desirability, but no difference between likelihood judgments for success and for failure may be observed because both are increased (relative to likelihood judgments of neutral outcomes). For example, Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995) gave participants a matrix of 20 ϫ 50 squares with varying proportions of black and white squares (see their Experiments 1-3; their Experiment 4, instead of the matrix of white and black squares, used transparent jars filled with varying proportions of white and red beads). The 1,000 white and black squares were randomly distributed, and the participants did not view the matrix long enough to count squares, so it was difficult to determine by merely looking at the matrix whether there were more black or white squares. Participants could win or lose money when there were more squares of one type than the other and were asked to judge the likelihood that they would win or lose. As participants judged winning no more likely than losing money (Experiments 2, 3, and 4), Bar-Hillel and Budescu concluded that there is no evidence for a desirability bias. According to the stake-likelihood effect, arousal from having a stake in the outcome increases likelihood judgments of both winning and losing. This might explain why the likelihood of winning was not judged higher than the likelihood of losing money. Data from Study 3 in this article support this interpretation.
Other Theories of Nonadditive Likelihood Judgments
From a normative point of view, however, the stake-likelihood effect is rather undesirable since likelihood judgments may not add up to 100% (depending on the overall over-or underestimation of likelihoods, likelihood judgments may be subadditive, i.e., add up to less than 100%, or superadditive, i.e., add up to more than 100%). 2 However, research in behavioral decision making under uncertainty has found several instances where people show sub-or superadditivity in judged probabilities; these theories are listed in Table 1 . According to confirmation bias or its refined version, positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987) , when people judge likelihoods of outcomes (e.g., how likely Team X is to win the game) they tend to focus on factors that support the focal hypothesis (e.g., Team X enjoys home advantage) and neglect factors that would support the alternative hypothesis (e.g., Team Y has better players). Thus, depending on how a probability question is framed (i.e., which outcome is part of the focal hypothesis), different likelihood judgments can be obtained for the same event. Tversky and Koehler (1994) developed a formalized version of the idea that people judge the likelihood of a hypothesis by how much support they can generate for it. Their model assumes that people tend to form a global impression that is based primarily on the most representative or available cases rather than unpacking the hypothesis into its exclusive components and adding their support. As a consequence, judged probability increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis because the support-generating process becomes more exhaustive. Extended support theory (Idson, Krantz, Osherson, & Bonini, 2001) and focalism (Windschitl, Rose, Stalkfleet, & Smith, 2008) suggest that, in contrast to support theory, people evaluate all evidence-both supportive and opposing-relevant to the focal entity and contrast this evidence against some internal standard rather than the evidence relevant to the nonfocal entity.
As already mentioned, people might also be motivated to strategically overestimate likelihoods of negative events if underestimation is more costly than overestimation (Weber, 1994 ). An example is strategic pessimism. People might overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes to diminish the emotional impact should the outcome materialize (Shepperd et al., 2000) . Importantly, strategic pessimism would depend on how aroused a decision maker is. Because arousal intensifies emotional reactions, aroused decision makers should overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome to a greater extent than nonaroused decision makers.
A fourth factor that influences likelihood judgments is imaginability. Imagining an event increases its subjective probability as it enhances elaboration and availability (Carroll, 1978; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Koehler, 1991) . Imaginability has been shown to increase likelihood judgments of positive (Carroll, 1978) and negative outcomes (Risen & Gilovich, 2007) .
Similar to imaginability, familiarity has been shown to influence likelihood judgments. Bar-Hillel et al. (2008) asked participants to estimate the likelihood of various teams winning in the World Cup soccer championship. The authors showed that the salience of an outcome can increase likelihood judgments and concluded that what appears to be a desirability bias may just be a salience/ marking effect. The authors stated that "although optimism is a robust and ubiquitous human phenomenon . . . wishful thinking still remains elusive" (Bar-Hillel et al., 2008, p. 278 ). Fox and Levav (2000) showed that the more familiar a future event is, the higher people judge the likelihood that it will occur and also that it will not occur.
Finally, query theory (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007; Weber et al., 2007 ) provides a process model for how evaluations based on identical information can differ. According to this theory, people consider pros and cons for a hypothesis (or choice option) serially. Retrieval interference causes aspects that were considered first-pros or cons-to be better recalled and thus more influential. Consequently, a hypothesis can be judged true or false (or likely or unlikely) based on the same information.
Except for strategic pessimism, all theories have in common that people weight some information more than other equally relevant information, which then can lead to nonadditive likelihood judgments; arousal is not thought of as affecting the likelihood judgment process. In contrast to differential weighting of information, the stake-likelihood effect stipulates that people misattribute likelihoods to the arousal from having a stake in the outcome, which Confirmation bias and positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987) When testing the likelihood of a hypothesis, people tend to test those cases that have the best chance of verifying current beliefs rather than those that have the best chance of falsifying them.
When people judge likelihoods of binary outcomes (e.g., how likely Team X is to win the game), they may evaluate factors that support the focal hypothesis (e.g., Team X enjoys home advantage) and neglect others that would support the alternative hypothesis (e.g., Team Y has better players).
No Support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) People evaluate the likelihood of hypotheses on the basis of how much support they can generate for each hypothesis. As support generation is nonexhaustive, hypotheses with greater extensions receive less support relative to hypotheses with smaller extensions.
Judged probability increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the alternative hypothesis.
No
Extended support theory (Idson, Krantz, Osherson, & Bonini, 2001 ) and focalism (Windschitl, Rose, Stalkfleet, & Smith, 2008) When people are asked to make a judgment that requires a comparison (e.g., how likely X is to occur instead of Y), they evaluate all evidence-both supportive and opposing-relevant to the focal entity and contrast this evidence against some internal standard rather than the evidence relevant to the nonfocal entity.
If two events X and Y have the same ratio of positive versus negative evidence for their occurrence, say 3/2, focusing on the former will lead to predicting that X is more likely to occur than Y. Likewise, focusing on Y will lead to predicting that Y is more likely than X.
Asymmetric loss functions/ strategic pessimism (Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Weber, 1994) Underestimating the likelihood of negative events can be more costly than overestimating their likelihood. As unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) , people might strategically overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome as a way of protecting themselves from the intense emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize.
Likelihood judgments of losses (but not of gains) are overestimated.
As arousal intensifies emotional reactions, strategic pessimism should be stronger the more aroused the decision maker is.
Imaginability (Carroll, 1978; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Koehler, 1991; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) Imagining an event increases its subjective probability through enhanced elaboration and availability.
Outcomes that are easier to imagine will be judged as more likely.
Vivid imagery might increase arousal (cf. Acosta & Vila, 1990) ; however, the reverse effect that arousal increases imaginability has not been shown. Familiarity (Bar-Hillel, Budescu, & Amar, 2008; Fox & Levav, 2000) Familiarity of an event increases its subjective probability because it is easier to imagine.
Familiar outcomes are judged more likely than unfamiliar outcomes.
Query theory (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007; Weber et al., 2007) Hypotheses (or choice options) are evaluated by decomposing them into component queries: "What speaks in favor of A?" and "What speaks in favor of B?" The queries are executed serially, and because of output interferences, retrieval is more successful for the query that came first.
Applied to subjective probabilities, people serially consider factors that support a hypothesis and those that speak against it. Depending on which factor is considered first or second, likelihood judgments are higher or lower, respectively.
No then leads to increased likelihood judgments of success and failure. As arousal also intensifies emotional reactions to outcomes, strategic pessimism predicts that aroused decision makers are motivated to overestimate likelihoods of losses to a greater extent than likelihoods of gains.
Overview of Experiments
In four studies, I tested the stake-likelihood effect. Study 1 tested whether aroused participants would make higher likelihood judgments than nonaroused participants. Study 2 examined whether arousal from having a positive stake in the outcome would be misattributed to likelihoods. In Study 3, misattribution of arousal was tested for positive and negative stakes in the outcome, and it was determined whether misattribution was stronger for negative than for positive outcomes. Study 4 examined whether soccer fans would make more extreme optimistic or pessimistic judgments about their favorite team winning when they could watch the match live rather than taped.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test whether arousal leads to an increase in likelihood judgments. Participants judged the likelihood of nine randomly selected events in an arousing or neutral format-with questions printed on an arousing bright-colored (bright pink) background or on a neutral flat-colored (gray) background (as in Menon & Kahn, 2002) . If arousal is misattributed to likelihood judgments, participants should judge likelihoods higher when probability questions are printed on arousing (i.e., bright pink) paper. No strategic pessimism was expected here since outcomes were not categorized into desirable and undesirable.
The hypothesis that decision makers base likelihood judgments partly on how aroused they are allows for another prediction. Arousal can be misattributed not only to the likelihood that an event will occur but also to the likelihood that this very same event will not occur. To test this additional prediction, I asked half of the participants nine probability questions such as "How likely do you think the U.S. army is to stay in Iraq in 2008?" and asked the other half for the nine complementary likelihoods such as "How likely do you think the U.S. army is to pull out of Iraq in 2008?" (see Table 2 ).
Method
Participants. Passers-by on a square near the University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA) were approached and 179 agreed to participate in a short questionnaire study (89 female, M age ϭ 24.10 years, SD ϭ 7.51; 90 male, M age ϭ 24.04 years, SD ϭ 7.78).
Procedure. In a 2 (arousal: aroused vs. not aroused) ϫ 2 (focus: likelihood of event occurring vs. not occurring) ϫ 9 (probability questions) mixed design with repeated measures on the last factor, half of the participants were asked nine likelihood questions, and the other half were asked for the nine complementary likelihoods (see Table 2 ). Arousal was manipulated by printing questionnaires on either bright pink paper (aroused) or gray paper (not aroused). Likelihood judgments were made on a 21-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% in 5% increments.
Results
Of the 179 respondents, 159 answered all nine probability questions. Likelihood judgments for the questions were highly dispersed (seven of the nine likelihood distributions deviated significantly from the normal distribution). Therefore, outliers further than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were discarded, resulting in exclusion of eight responses. Including these responses did not change the significance levels of the observed effects.
A 2 (focus) ϫ 2 (arousal) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the averaged likelihood judgments yielded a main effect for focus, F(1, 147) ϭ 3.91, p ϭ .05, d ϭ 0.33, and, as predicted, a main effect for arousal, F(1, 147) ϭ 7.93, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 0.46 (see Figure 2 ). Respondents judged likelihoods higher when questions were printed on bright pink paper (M ϭ 49.19%, SD ϭ 8.82) than when questions were printed on gray paper (M ϭ 45.16%, SD ϭ 9.21). The interaction of focus and arousal was not significant (F Ͻ 1). Note. Half of the respondents judged the likelihoods of occurrence of the outcomes described in the left column, while the other half judged the likelihoods of the complementary outcomes described in the right column.
Discussion
The results suggest that arousal increases likelihood judgments-whether those judgments are made for the occurrence of an event or for its nonoccurrence. Participants who were more aroused because they read probability questions printed on a bright pink background gave higher likelihood judgments than participants who read the same questions on a flat gray-colored background. More important, participants judged both the likelihood of an event occurring and the complementary likelihood of the same event not occurring higher when questions were printed on a bright pink background. This finding cannot be explained by strategic pessimism since outcomes were not categorized by their desirability.
However, alternative explanations are possible. For example, respondents might in general answer questions more conservatively or cautiously when they are printed on gray rather than pink paper as gray paper looks more official and serious, and there was no incentive for accuracy or penalty for inaccuracy. Study 2 was designed to overcome these shortcomings and incentivized respondents to give accurate likelihood judgments. To this end, a probabilistic event whose objective probability of occurrence was known to the researcher (to incentivize participants for accurate judgments) but was difficult to assess for participants was used.
Study 2
As the objective probabilities of real-world events are unknowable, I used a die-rolling game in which a computer rolled a six-sided die four times. Participants could win $5 if the computer tossed at least one 3 within the four rolls. They were asked to judge the likelihood that, within four die rolls, either a 3 would turn up at least once or no 3 would turn up. The probability of at least one 3 turning up within four rolls follows the binomial distribution and can be calculated as
Participants' likelihood judgments could thus be compared to the objective probabilities and incentivized for accuracy. Importantly, though, most people are not familiar with the binomial distribution and cannot produce the above formula, so they are forced to rely on their intuition when judging how likely the outcome in question is to occur. This corresponds to real-world situations where objective probabilities of events are unknowable, such as judging the likelihood that a candidate will win an election or that a football team will win a certain match. According to the stake-likelihood effect, participants should misattribute the arousal from having a stake in the outcome (the prospect of winning $5) to the likelihood that this outcome would occur or not occur. To test the misattribution process directly, I manipulated the order in which arousal and likelihood measures were administered.
Testing Misattribution of Arousal by Manipulating the Order of Measures
In standard arousal misattribution paradigms, respondents are administered an arousing drug but told that it does not influence arousal. Consequently, they are more likely to misattribute the induced arousal to the unrelated judgment of interest. Alternatively, respondents are administered a placebo but told that it does induce arousal. These respondents are then less likely to misattribute their actual arousal to an unrelated judgment. Common to both paradigms is that participants have to be deceived about the effects of the administered drug.
Rather than deceiving participants, I tested misattribution of participants' arousal by manipulating the attribution process itself. Participants are more likely to report experienced arousal when the arousal-triggering situation is made salient and are consequently less prone to misattribute arousal to an unrelated cause (Reisenzein & Gattinger, 1982) . According to this logic, altering the order in which participants rate their arousal and judge the likelihood that the outcome will occur should impact whether arousal is reported on arousal measures or is misattributed to likelihoods. When respondents are first asked to judge likelihoods, they should misattribute their arousal to the likelihoods and should thus be less likely to subsequently report arousal from having a stake in the outcome. In contrast, when respondents are first asked to rate their arousal, they should report arousal from having a stake in the outcome but subsequently judge the likelihood that the outcome occurs lower as they should be less likely to misattribute their (already reported) arousal to that likelihood. This attribution process is akin to Schwarz and Clore's (1983) finding that when people are asked about their life satisfaction, they use their momentary affective states in making these judgments. However, when they are given the opportunity to attribute their present feelings to irrelevant external sources (e.g., they are first asked what the weather is like), their momentary affective states no longer have an impact on their reported life satisfaction.
Method
Participants. Participants were 50 students (29 male, M age ϭ 19.90 years, SD ϭ 0.82; 21 female, M age ϭ 20.10 years, SD ϭ 1.30) at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, PA), recruited for an experimental session composed of several studies. Participants received course credit for participation. After completion of an unrelated study, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form and were seated in front of individual computer desks. The computer program collected demographic information and explained the die-roll game. The die-roll game. Participants were told that the computer would roll a die four times. If the computer rolled a 3 at least once within the four rolls, they would win $5. Half of the participants were asked how likely they were to get a 3 at least once within the four rolls. The other half were asked how likely they were to get no 3s within the four rolls. Participants in the likelihood-judgmentfirst condition were asked to judge the likelihood that they would get a 3 at least once or get no 3s and then to rate their arousal level on a subsequent screen. Arousal was measured as liking of the game and excitement about playing the game. Participants in the arousal-rating-first condition rated their arousal level first and then judged likelihoods on a subsequent screen.
Procedure. The experiment employed a 2 (focus: likelihood of focal vs. nonfocal outcome occurring) ϫ 2 (order of measures: likelihood judgment first vs. arousal rating first) between-subjects design. The dependent variables were rated arousal level and judged likelihood. Likelihood judgments were made on a 21-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% in 5% increments. Interdependence of the complementary outcomes was stressed by anchoring scales on both sides as 0% ϭ I will definitely get no 3s and 100% ϭ I will definitely get one or more 3s (McKenzie, 1999) . In the condition where participants judged the complementary likelihood of getting no 3s, the anchors were reversed. Arousal was measured on two 7-point Likert-type scales: "How much do you like playing this game?" (1 ϭ not at all, 7 ϭ very much) and "How exciting is it to play this game?" (1 ϭ not very exciting, 7 ϭ very exciting). Participants were told that they would earn $1 if their probability estimate fell within 5% of the objective probability.
After participants had made their judgments and ratings, the computer simulated four die rolls. If the computer tossed at least one 3 within the four rolls, participants won $5. Participants were paid $1 if their likelihood judgment was accurate within 5%. After completion of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Likelihood judgments. A 2 (focus) ϫ 2 (order of measures) ANOVA on the dependent variable likelihood judgment yielded a main effect for focus, F(1, 46) ϭ 4.51, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 0.63, indicating that respondents judged it more likely that they would get no 3s (M ϭ 51.60%, SD ϭ 28.71) than that they would get at least one 3 (M ϭ 36.60%, SD ϭ 23.44). As predicted, a main effect for the order of measures was observed, F(1, 46) ϭ 4.18, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 0.60 (see Figure 3 ). Respondents judged likelihoods higher when likelihoods were judged before arousal levels were rated (M ϭ 51.15%, SD ϭ 26.39) than when likelihoods were judged after arousal levels were rated (M ϭ 36.46%, SD ϭ 26.11). The interaction of focus and order of measures was not significant (F Ͻ 1).
Arousal level. As expected, the two measures of arousal, liking of playing the game and excitement from playing the game, were highly correlated (r ϭ .73, p Ͻ .001); both measures were averaged into one arousal score. A one-way ANOVA yielded the hypothesized effect for order of the measures, F(1, 48) ϭ 4.24, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 0.59, indicating that when arousal levels were rated first, respondents reported greater arousal from playing the game (M ϭ 5.06, SD ϭ 1.15) than when likelihoods were judged first (M ϭ 4.35, SD ϭ 1.30; see Figure 3 ). 3
Discussion
Study 2 tested misattribution of arousal to likelihoods by varying the order in which arousal ratings and likelihood judgments were made. Arousal from having a stake in the focal outcome (winning $5 when the computer rolled at least one 3 within four die rolls) was reported on-or misattributed to-whatever measure came first, arousal ratings or likelihood judgments. Respondents judged the likelihood of the focal outcome and the likelihood of the nonfocal outcome higher when they judged these likelihoods before rather than after they rated their arousal level. Arousal ratings showed the reverse pattern: Arousal levels were lower when likelihoods were judged before rather than after arousal was rated. This reversal of elevation of likelihood judgments and arousal levels (i.e., two main effects in opposite directions) demonstrates that elevated likelihood judgments of the desirable outcome occurring/not occurring are indeed caused by misattributed arousal from having a stake in the outcome (i.e., the prospect of winning $5) rather than by imaginability, confirmation bias, focalism, or differential information-retrieval processes (query theory; cf. Table 1) .
One aspect of the results of Study 2 deserves attention-the accuracy of likelihood judgments. Compared to the objective probabilities, likelihood judgments made after arousal level was rated were too low. Support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) helps to explain this finding. In the die-rolling game, support for a hypothesis, that is, all instances that speak in favor of a hypothesis, can be precisely determined. There are 6 4 ϭ 1,296 possible outcomes of rolling four dice. The focal outcome (getting at least one 3) represents 671 cases, the nonfocal outcome (getting no 3s) 625. According to support theory, the greater the extension of a hy-3 Virtually identical results were obtained when liking and excitement ratings were analyzed as two separate measures in a repeated measures ANOVA. Figure 3 . Average judgments of likelihood (left graph) and average arousal level ratings (right graph) in Study 2. Participants judged the likelihood that they would get a 3 at least once within four die rolls (solid black bars) or the complementary likelihood that they would get no 3s (striped gray bars). Participants rated their arousal level before judging the likelihoods (arousal ratings first) or judged likelihoods before rating arousal (likelihood judgment first). Error bars represent Ϯ1 standard error from the mean. pothesis (i.e., the number of instances that it entails), the less exhaustive is the support-generation process because people tend to form a global impression that is based primarily on the most representative or available cases. Thus, both likelihoods for the focal and nonfocal hypotheses might have been underestimated as they both entailed a large number of supportive instances (i.e., both have relatively large extensions). Following this logic, hypotheses with smaller extensions should be judged more accurately, and hypotheses with larger extensions should be further underestimated. Study 3 tested this prediction. Study 3 also extended the research by examining likelihood judgments for desirable (positive) and undesirable (negative) events.
Study 3
As in Study 2, I used a die-rolling paradigm (a die is rolled four times) in which participants were incentivized for accurate likelihood judgments. Participants were asked to judge the likelihood that a certain outcome would occur (6 turning up twice) or the likelihood that this outcome would not occur (6 turning up fewer or more than two times). Hereafter, the outcome of a 6 coming up twice is called the focal outcome (because it determined whether participants won or lost), and the complementary outcome of a 6 coming up fewer or more than two times is called the nonfocal outcome. The probability of 6 turning up twice within four rolls again follows the binomial distribution
This allowed for testing whether misattribution to likelihoods would occur not only for midlevel probabilities (Study 2) but also for low (i.e., 11.57% probability of getting exactly two 6s) and high probability levels (88.43% probability of not getting two 6s). Furthermore, according to support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) the smaller the extension of a hypothesis (i.e., the number of instances that it entails), the more exhaustive is the supportgeneration process. Thus, likelihood judgments should be more accurate for the focal outcome (because it represents only 150 out of the 1,296 cases), but likelihoods should be largely underestimated for the nonfocal outcome (because it represents 1,146 cases).
Some respondents won a shot glass when a 6 came up twice, while others lost their shot glass when a 6 came up twice (shot glasses with the university emblem were chosen as stakes in the outcome as pretests had demonstrated their attractiveness for students). Participants were given $3 as remuneration for their participation. In addition to making likelihood judgments, participants were asked how much of the $3 they were willing to bet on 6 coming up twice.
According to the stake-likelihood effect, participants with a stake in the outcome (i.e., who can win or lose a shot glass) will judge the likelihood of the focal outcome and the likelihood of the nonfocal outcome higher than those without a stake in the outcome (no matter whether the stake is positive, i.e., a gain, or negative, i.e., a loss). This prediction can be directly contrasted to a desirability bias that would predict increased likelihood judgments of winning but decreased likelihood judgments of losing. Furthermore, according to strategic pessimism, likelihoods of negative outcomes (losing the shot glass) would be expected to be more elevated than likelihoods of positive outcomes (winning the shot glass).
To control for potential differences in imaginability between the no-stake and the stake-in-the-outcome conditions, a fifth condition that controlled for differences in imaginability was included; it is described in detail in the Method section. Note that confirmation bias, focalism, and query theory do not predict differences in likelihood judgments for varying stakes in the outcome.
Method
Participants. Two hundred eighty-nine participants were recruited for a study on individual decision making through the Center for Behavioral Decision Research website at Carnegie Mellon University (149 male, M age ϭ 22.00 years, SD ϭ 6.80; 140 female, M age ϭ 22.67 years, SD ϭ 6.67). Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants received $3 as remuneration for participation, were asked to read and sign a consent form, and were seated in front of individual computer desks. The computer program was self-explanatory. Participants were first asked to enter their age and gender. Then, they read the instructions of the die-roll game and, on a subsequent screen, were asked to repeat the instructions in their own words to ensure that they had understood them.
Design. The experiment employed a 2 (focus: likelihood of focal vs. nonfocal outcome occurring) ϫ 5 (stake: five conditions described in the following section, each with differing stakes in the outcome) between-subjects design. The main dependent variable was judged likelihood. Participants were told that they would earn $1 if their probability estimate fell within 5% of the objective probability.
The five stake conditions. Participants were assigned to five stake conditions that differed in the stake participants had in the outcome: hypothetical versus win versus neutral versus lose versus win low imaginability. In the hypothetical condition, participants were asked to imagine the computer tossing a die four times. Half of the participants were asked how likely it was that the computer would roll 6 on two of the four rolls. The other half were asked for the likelihood that the computer would roll 6 fewer or more than two times. The experiment ended after the likelihood judgments for these participants.
Participants in the four other conditions were told that the computer would roll a die four times. In the win condition, participants were shown a shot glass and were told that they would win it if the computer rolled 6 twice. Subsequently, they judged the likelihood of winning or not winning the shot glass. Participants were told that they would receive 3 times their wager if the computer rolled 6 twice and were asked how much of their $3 they were willing to bet on this occurring.
In the lose condition, participants were first given a shot glass and told that they would lose it if the computer rolled 6 twice. Then, they judged the likelihood of losing or not losing the shot glass and indicated their willingness to bet part of their $3 on this event occurring, framed as insurance against losing the shot glass.
In the neutral condition, participants had no stake in the outcome. They judged the likelihood of the computer rolling 6 twice or rolling 6 fewer or more than two times. After this judgment was made, participants were asked how much of the $3 they were willing to bet on the computer rolling 6 twice.
The fifth stake condition, win low imaginability, was added to control for potential differences in imaginability between the win and lose conditions and the neutral condition. In the win and lose conditions, participants were asked to judge the likelihood of winning/losing the shot glass rather than the likelihood of the computer rolling or not rolling two 6s, as in the neutral condition. Focusing on likelihoods involving the shot glass (rather than likelihoods of the computer rolling dice) could increase participants' ability to actively or passively imagine the outcome's occurrence or nonoccurrence. Hence, elevated likelihood judgments in the win and lose conditions might be due to easier imaginability of the outcome's occurrence or nonoccurrence (cf. Table 1 ). To test for this possibility, the fifth condition, win low imaginability, was a combination of the win and the neutral condition. As in the win condition, participants were shown the shot glass and told that they would win it if the computer rolled 6 twice. However, rather than being asked to judge the likelihood of winning or not winning the shot glass, they were asked to judge the likelihood of the computer rolling 6 twice or not rolling 6 twice, as in the neutral condition. If imaginability is responsible for elevated likelihood judgments, participants in the win condition should give higher likelihood judgments than participants in the win low imaginability condition. After the likelihood judgments, participants in the win low imaginability condition were also asked how much of the $3 they were willing to bet on the computer rolling 6 twice.
All participants except for those in the hypothetical condition then played the game. The computer simulated four die rolls. If the computer tossed two 6s within the four rolls, participants in the win and win low imaginability conditions got the shot glass, and participants in the lose condition lost their shot glass. Participants were paid $1 if their probability judgment was correct (Ϯ5%), and received 3 times their wager if the computer had rolled 6 twice.
Dependent variables. Likelihood judgments were made on a 21-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% in 5% increments. Interdependence of the complementary outcomes was stressed by anchoring scales on both sides as 0% ϭ [nonfocal outcome] will definitely occur and 100% ϭ [focal outcome] will definitely occur (cf. McKenzie, 1999) . In the conditions where participants focused on the likelihood of the nonfocal outcome, anchors were reversed. Participants' willingness to bet was measured on a subsequent screen as how much of the participants' $3 remuneration they were willing to bet on the computer rolling exactly two 6s. This willingness to bet was rated on a 13-point scale ranging from $0 to $3 in $0.25 increments.
Results
Likelihood judgments. A 2 (focus) ϫ 5 (stake) betweensubjects ANOVA showed a main effect for focus, F(1, 279) ϭ 141.69, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.43, indicating that participants judged the likelihood of the computer rolling 6 twice lower (M ϭ 20.51%, SD ϭ 18.94) than the likelihood of the computer rolling 6 fewer or more than two times (M ϭ 60.49%, SD ϭ 30.65). A main effect for stake indicated that likelihood judgments differed across stake conditions, F(4, 279) ϭ 5.38, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ 0.072 (see Figure 4 ).
Since standard deviations differed significantly across conditions, Levene's test for homogeneous variances F(9, 279) ϭ 11.06, p Ͻ .001, corrections of the degrees of freedom for unequal variances were applied to contrast tests where necessary. In sup-port of the stake-likelihood effect, respondents judged the focal outcome occurring (computer rolling 6 twice) more likely when they had a stake in the outcome (win: M ϭ 19.77%, SD ϭ 16.07; win low imaginability: M ϭ 25.00%, SD ϭ 16.26; lose: M ϭ 38.91%, SD ϭ 28.92) than when no gain or loss was associated with the outcome (neutral and hypothetical conditions, M ϭ 13.44%, SD ϭ 10.43; M ϭ 14.33%, SD ϭ 13.57, respectively). The according planned contrast was estimated with the following weights: win (1), lose (1), win low imaginability (1), hypothetical (Ϫ1.5), and neutral (Ϫ1.5): t(40.06) ϭ 4.31, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 0.69.
Likewise, respondents judged the complementary likelihood of the nonfocal outcome occurring (computer rolling 6 fewer or more than two times) higher when they had a stake in the outcome (win: M ϭ 72.32%, SD ϭ 27.40; win low imaginability: M ϭ 61.67%, SD ϭ 36.87; lose: M ϭ 61.79%, SD ϭ 28.45) than when no gain or loss was associated with the outcome (neutral and hypothetical conditions, M ϭ 55.83%, SD ϭ 30.06; M ϭ 52.58%, SD ϭ 31.14, respectively), planned contrast with same weights as above:
To test the accuracy of likelihood judgments, likelihoods were tested against the objective probabilities of 11.57% for getting exactly two 6s and against 88.43% for getting fewer or more than two 6s. According to support theory, likelihood judgments should be more accurate the smaller the objective probability. Furthermore, likelihood judgments should be elevated when participants have a stake in the outcome. Supporting both hypotheses, participants were on average accurate in judging the likelihood of getting exactly two 6s when they had no stake in the outcome (neutral and hypothetical conditions: M ϭ 13.87%, SD ϭ 11.96), t test against 11.57%: t(61) ϭ 1.51, p ϭ .135, d ϭ 0.39, but overestimated likelihoods when they had a stake in the outcome (win, win low imaginability, and lose conditions, M ϭ 24.84%, computer rolls fewer or more than two 6s computer rolls 6 twice Figure 4 . Average judgments of likelihood in Study 3. Participants judged either the likelihood that the computer would roll a 6 twice within four die rolls (solid line) or the complementary likelihood that the computer would roll fewer or more than two 6s (broken line). The five stake conditions (lose, hypothetical, win, neutral, and win low imaginability) represent varying levels of participants' stake in the outcome. Error bars represent Ϯ1 standard error from the mean. SD ϭ 21.32), t(94) ϭ 6.07, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 1.25. In contrast, participants largely underestimated the likelihood of getting fewer or more than two 6s when they had no stake in the outcome (neutral and hypothetical conditions, M ϭ 54.18%, SD ϭ 30.40), t test against 88.43%: t(61) ϭ 8.80, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 2.25, and underestimated this likelihood to a lesser extent when they had a stake in the outcome (win, win low imaginability, and lose conditions, M ϭ 65.92%, SD ϭ 30.02), t(70) ϭ 6.32, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 1.51.
As predicted by strategic pessimism, the interaction of focus and stake was significant, F(4, 279) ϭ 3.00, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ 0.041. Respondents judged it more likely that they would lose the shot glass (M ϭ 38.91%, SD ϭ 28.92) than that they would win it (M ϭ 19.77%, SD ϭ 16.07) and judged it less likely that they would not lose the shot glass (M ϭ 61.79%, SD ϭ 28.45) than that they would not win it (M ϭ 72.32% SD ϭ 27.40), planned contrast weights: lose (1), win (Ϫ1), not lose (Ϫ1), not win (1), all other conditions (0): t(78.34) ϭ 3.03, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 0.36.
Contrary to the imaginability hypothesis, respondents judged the likelihood of winning or not winning the shot glass in the win condition as likely as the likelihood of the computer rolling 6 twice or rolling 6 fewer or more than two times in the win low imaginability condition, planned contrast weights: win (1), win low imaginability (Ϫ1), not win (1), not win low imaginability (Ϫ1), all other conditions (0): t(31.03) ϭ 0.44, p ϭ .67, d ϭ 0.05.
Wagers/insurance. A 2 (focus) ϫ 5 (stake) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted with the covariate likelihood judgment on the dependent variable wager/insurance (in the lose condition, wager was framed as insurance against losing the shot glass; all likelihood judgments were coded such that they indicated the probability that the focal outcome would occur, i.e., a 6 would come up twice). The covariate likelihood judgment became significant, F(1, 219) ϭ 18.17, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ 0.077, indicating that respondents bet more money/put more money into insurance the more likely they thought the focal outcome was to occur. No reliable differences were observed across stake, F(3, 219) ϭ 2.01, p ϭ .11, 2 ϭ 0.027, or focus conditions, F(1, 219) ϭ 0.41, p ϭ .52, d ϭ 0.09.
Discussion
Participants judged the likelihood of a computer rolling a 6 twice and the likelihood of the computer rolling a 6 fewer or more than two times higher when they could win or lose a shot glass than when they had no stake in this outcome. This finding supports the stakelikelihood effect, according to which participants misattributed the arousal from having a (positive or negative) stake in the outcome to the likelihood that the focal and nonfocal outcomes would occur. Furthermore, participants judged it more likely that they would lose the shot glass than that they would win it (the opposite was true for the corresponding complementary likelihood judgments). This finding supports Weber's (1994) suggestion that underestimating the likelihood of negative events can be more costly than overestimating their likelihood. Participants engaged in strategic pessimism as they judged a loss more likely than a gain, thereby diminishing the aversive emotional impact should a loss occur (Shepperd et al., 2000) . Taken together, these results are consistent with the findings of Bar-Hillel and Budescu's (1995) Experiments 2, 3, and 4. Bar-Hillel and Budescu concluded that there was no evidence for a desirability bias. In their Experiment 2, participants judged losses as likely as wins. According to the stake-likelihood effect, both likelihood judgments would be expected to be elevated as participants misattributed arousal from the stake in the outcome to the likelihoods. In their Experiments 3 and 4, averaging over all probability levels, Bar-Hillel and Busdescu found slightly higher likelihood judgments for losses than for gains (opposite to a desirability bias). This might reflect participants' strategic pessimism, in accordance with the results of my Study 3.
Regarding accuracy of the judgments, likelihood judgments for the focal outcome were accurate when participants had no stake in the outcome but were too high when participants had a stake in the outcome. Likelihood judgments for the nonfocal outcome were generally too low (but again were higher when participants had a stake in the outcome). This pattern provides evidence for support theory's (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) prediction that the greater the extension of a hypothesis (i.e., the more cases it entails), the less exhaustive is the support-generating process (i.e., the relatively lower likelihood judgments become).
Imaginability does not seem to be responsible for the observed pattern. Participants who could win a shot glass judged winning or not winning the shot glass as likely as the computer rolling a 6 twice or rolling a 6 fewer or more than two times. Furthermore, optimism and pessimism were observed even though participants were rewarded with $1 for making accurate likelihood judgments, and the typically large standard deviations of likelihood judgments make it difficult to detect differences in subjective probabilities.
Arousal from having a stake in the outcome also impacted-via likelihood judgments-participants' decisions about how much to bet on the focal outcome's occurrence. The more likely participants thought it was for a 6 to come up twice, the more money they wagered on this outcome. Likewise, participants who could lose their shot glass put more money into insurance against losing their shot glass the more likely they thought the focal outcome was to occur. Such betting/insuring behavior that is magnified by the feeling of excitement or nervousness about the stake in the outcome is akin to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, which states that in risky situations, emotional reactions can drive behavior (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) .
In conclusion, the results of Study 3 contradict the predictions of a desirability bias (which would predict increased likelihood judgments for gains but decreased likelihood judgments for losses). Imaginability was not responsible for the observed effects, and confirmation bias, focalism, positive test strategy, or query theory would not predict differences in likelihood judgments as a function of the stake in the outcome. The results of Study 3 thus provide strong support for the stake-likelihood effect.
When applied to sports settings, the desirability bias is called allegiance bias, which posits that identification with or psychological investment in an outcome affects outcome predictions. The allegiance bias is typically tested in natural settings such as elections or sports games. Study 4 thus tested whether the stakelikelihood effect could also be demonstrated in a field setting with fans of professional soccer.
Study 4
I asked students at the University of Cologne in Cologne, Germany, to imagine that they were to watch an upcoming Euro-pean Champions League soccer match between Manchester United (a prominent English team) and VfB Stuttgart (a well-known German team favored by most of the students). This match was awaited with great anticipation because Stuttgart, the underdog in this match, had defeated Manchester United in the first round, and so, German soccer fans were eager to see whether Stuttgart would be able to defeat Manchester United a second time. Participants were told that a friend had offered to bet on the outcome of the match. Half the respondents were told that the friend had offered to bet that Stuttgart would win or tie the game; the other half were told that the friend had offered to bet that Stuttgart would lose. Thus, half of the respondents were asked how likely Stuttgart was to win or tie, while the other half were asked how likely Stuttgart was to lose.
To manipulate arousal, half the participants were told that they would watch the game live, while the other half were told that they would watch the game tape-delayed by 2 hours due to a conflict over broadcasting rights among the different channels. This was credible as at the time there had been a high-profile conflict over those rights among various German TV channels. This manipulation was chosen as people prefer watching sports events live rather than taped because the former is more exciting/arousing due to indeterminacy, the perception that the unfolding of the game is not decided ex ante (Nelson, Galak, & Vosgerau, 2008; Vosgerau, Wertenbroch, & Carmon, 2006) . As it might be easier to imagine watching a game live rather than taped, participants were also asked how easy or difficult it was to imagine the scenario.
According to the stake-likelihood effect, German students should judge their favorite team, Stuttgart, to be more likely to win and more likely to lose when having the prospect of watching the game live rather than taped. Furthermore, participants were expected to engage in strategic pessimism to a greater extent when they had the prospect of watching the game live, as a loss by Stuttgart would be emotionally more intense when watching the game in this situation. Consequently, in the live viewing condition, the likelihood of Stuttgart losing should be elevated to a greater extent than the likelihood of Stuttgart winning/tying.
Method
Respondents and procedure. One hundred participants (mostly students; 84 male, M age ϭ 24.83 years, SD ϭ 3.36; 16 female, M age ϭ 22.50 years, SD ϭ 1.32) were recruited at the University of Cologne, a large public university in Germany. Participants were intercepted at the university's cafeterias and asked whether they were interested in soccer. Those reporting an interest were asked to fill out a brief questionnaire about the upcoming soccer match in return for a chocolate bar.
Design and dependent variables. The study employed a 2 (viewing mode: live vs. taped) ϫ 2 (outcome focus: Stuttgart winning or tying vs. losing) between-subjects design. Dependent variables were how likely respondents rated the focal outcome ("How likely is Stuttgart to win or tie?" vs. "How likely is Stuttgart to lose?") on a 0% to 100% Likert-type scale in 10% increments and respondents' willingness to bet ("How much would you be willing to bet on Stuttgart winning/tying?" and "How much would you be willing to bet on Stuttgart losing?" in euros). Respondents were also asked on separate 7-point rating scales how likely they were to watch the game as described, how interested they were in the game, and how difficult they found the scenario to imagine (0 ϭ not at all, 6 ϭ highly). Finally, I asked respondents which team they supported.
Results
Support of Stuttgart versus Manchester
United. Seventyfour percent of the respondents reported supporting Stuttgart, 15% reported supporting Manchester United, 10% were indifferent, and one respondent did not answer the question. All subsequent analyses hold whether conducted on only the Stuttgart supporters or on the full sample.
Broadcast preferences. To examine whether live broadcasts were preferred over taped ones, a 2 (viewing mode) ϫ 2 (outcome focus) ANCOVA on the likelihood of watching the game was conducted, with general interest in the game as a covariate. As expected, general interest in the game had a significant positive impact on likelihood of watching the game, F(1, 95) ϭ 19.05, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ 0.167. More importantly though, the main effect of viewing mode was observed, F(1, 95) ϭ 11.08, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 0.68, indicating that having the prospect of watching the game live rather than taped made respondents more likely to watch the game (M ϭ 4.80, SD ϭ 1.41; M ϭ 4.02, SD ϭ 2.23, respectively). Outcome focus (Stuttgart winning or tying vs. losing) did not impact the likelihood of watching the game, F(1, 95) ϭ 1.55, p ϭ .22, d ϭ 0.26, nor did the interaction of viewing mode and outcome focus, F(1, 95) ϭ 0.25, p ϭ .62, d ϭ 0.10.
Likelihood judgments. A 2 (viewing mode) ϫ 2 (outcome focus) ANOVA on the dependent variable likelihood judgment yielded the main effect for viewing mode, F(1, 96) ϭ 13.37, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 0.75, indicating that respondents judged the likelihood of Stuttgart winning or tying and of Stuttgart losing higher for the live (M ϭ 62.90%, SD ϭ 13.48) than for the taped broadcast (M ϭ 51.80%, SD ϭ 17.11). Outcome focus did not have a significant impact on likelihood judgments, F(1, 96) ϭ 1.82, p ϭ .18, d ϭ 0.28. The interaction of viewing mode and outcome focus was marginally significant, F(1, 96) ϭ 3.05, p ϭ .08, d ϭ 0.36, indicating that watching the match live rather than taped increased the judged likelihood that Stuttgart would lose (M ϭ 67.60%, SD ϭ 12.34; M ϭ 51.20%, SD ϭ 17.87, respectively) to a greater extent than it increased the likelihood that Stuttgart would win or tie (M ϭ 58.20%, SD ϭ 13.14; M ϭ 52.40%, SD ϭ 16.65, respectively; see Figure 5 ). Wagers. One respondent reported a willingness to bet €100 (Ϸ $156 at the time), an amount that deviated more than seven standard deviations from the mean wager of €9.46. This response was discarded in the following analysis. All other wagers were within 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. A 2 (viewing mode) ϫ 2 (outcome focus) ANCOVA with the covariates likelihood judgment and interest in the game was conducted on the dependent variable willingness to bet. The covariate likelihood judgment was marginally significant, F(1, 93) ϭ 3.44, p ϭ .07, 2 ϭ 0.036, indicating that respondents bet more money on Stuttgart winning/tying or losing the more likely they thought Stuttgart was to win/tie or to lose. All other effects were not significant: covariate interest in the game, F(1, 93) ϭ 1.49, p ϭ .23, 2 ϭ 0.016; main effect of viewing mode, F(1, 93) ϭ 0.10, p ϭ .75, d ϭ 0.07; main effect of outcome focus, F(1, 93) ϭ 0.05, p ϭ .82, d ϭ 0.04; interaction, F(1, 93) ϭ 0.36, p ϭ .55, d ϭ 0.12.
Difficulty in imagining the scenario. To examine whether the live broadcast scenario was easier to imagine than the taped broadcast scenario, a 2 (viewing mode) ϫ 2 (outcome focus) ANCOVA on the difficulty of imagining the scenario was conducted, with general interest in the game as a covariate. Neither the covariate general interest in the game , F(1, 95) 
Discussion
In Study 4, soccer fans were found to be more optimistic and more pessimistic when they could watch a game live than when it was taped. Supporters of VfB Stuttgart judged it more likely that Stuttgart would win or tie in the taped broadcast condition than in the live broadcast condition. They also judged Stuttgart more likely to lose when watching the game live rather than taped. Such simultaneous optimism and pessimism due to misattributed arousal from having the prospect of watching the game live (Nelson et al., 2008; Vosgerau et al., 2006) is at odds with a desirability or allegiance bias, which would predict that fans show decreased, rather than increased, likelihood judgments of Stuttgart losing.
An alternative explanation for elevated probability judgments in the live broadcast conditions might be that imagining an event increases its subjective probability through enhanced elaboration and availability (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) . If it is easier to imagine watching an event shown in real time than to imagine watching it taped, this manipulation might affect availability instead of arousal, leading to inflated subjective probability judgments. To test this possibility, an ANCOVA of the difficulty of imagining the scenario was conducted. Contrary to the availability and imagery explanation (and parallel to Study 3's results), no effects were found of viewing condition, outcome focus, or interest in the game on how difficult participants found it to imagine the scenario.
Participants in Study 4 were more afraid that Stuttgart would lose than they were optimistic that Stuttgart would win or tie. Participants engaged in strategic pessimism as they overestimated the likelihood of Stuttgart losing the game to a greater extent than the likelihood of Stuttgart winning or tying, thereby diminishing the emotional impact should Stuttgart actually lose. None of the other theories listed in Table 1 can account for the findings as they do not hypothesize that arousal influences the likelihood judgment process.
Arousal from watching the game live impacted not only likelihood judgments but also-via likelihood judgments-fans' willingness to bet on Stuttgart winning/tying or losing. The more likely fans thought Stuttgart was to win/tie or to lose, the more money they were willing to bet on that outcome.
General Discussion
In an attempt to understand what makes people more optimistic or pessimistic when judging the likelihood of future events, I have proposed that focusing on success produces optimism and focusing on failure produces pessimism. When a future outcome is desirable (i.e., denotes a success) or undesirable (i.e., denotes a failure), a decision maker has a stake in the outcome. Because decision makers misattribute their arousal from having a stake in the outcome to the likelihood of the outcome occurring, they judge the likelihood that a desirable outcome will occur and the likelihood that an undesirable outcome will occur higher than the likelihood that a neutral outcome will occur.
Study 1 tested the basic premise that arousal can be misattributed to the likelihood of an event occurring. Participants who read questions from a bright pink background were more aroused (Menon & Kahn, 2002) and judged the likelihood of events occurring, and also the complementary likelihood that the events will not occur, higher than participants who read the same questions from a flat gray-colored background. Study 2 tested whether arousal from having the prospect of winning money would be misattributed to likelihoods of the outcome occurring and not occurring. Participants judged it more likely that they would win $5, or that they would not win $5, in a die-roll game when they judged these likelihoods before rather than after they rated their arousal level. The arousal ratings showed the opposite pattern, with arousal rated higher when it was rated before likelihood judgments were made. Thus, arousal from having a stake in the outcome (potentially winning $5) was reported on-or misattributed to-whatever measure came first, arousal ratings or likelihood judgments. In Study 3, stake in the outcome was manipulated at the levels positive, neutral, and negative. Participants who could win or lose a shot glass in a die-roll game judged the likelihood that these outcomes would occur, and the complementary likelihood that they would not occur, higher than participants who could not win or lose anything. Finally, Study 4 tested the stakelikelihood effect in a sports setting. Soccer fans were shown to be more optimistic and more pessimistic about their favorite team winning when they had the prospect of watching the match live rather than taped (having the prospect of watching a game live is more exciting; Vosgerau et al., 2006) . In all four studies, arousal was shown to elevate judgments not only of the likelihood of the focal outcome to occur (success or failure) but also of the likelihood of the nonfocal outcome to occur (nonsuccess or nonfailure). Study 3 demonstrated that the valence of the stake in the outcome does not matter, that is, no matter whether participants can win or lose, they misattribute their arousal from having a stake in the outcome to the likelihood that the outcome will occur/not occur. The simultaneous elevation of complementary likelihoods provides reliable support for the notion that having a stake in an outcome can produce optimism (increased likelihood judgments of success/nonfailure) and pessimism (increased likelihood judgments of nonsuccess/failure). These effects were shown while controlling for imaginability of the outcomes (Studies 3 and 4) and monetarily rewarding participants for making accurate likelihood judgments (Studies 2 and 3).
While Study 2 asked participants to judge the likelihood of a desirable outcome to occur or not occur, Studies 3 and 4 asked for likelihood judgments of desirable and undesirable events. In both studies, it was found that, contrary to desirability bias, people judged it more likely that a negative outcome would occur than that a positive outcome would occur. This finding is consistent with Weber's (1994) suggestion that underestimating the likelihood of negative events can be more costly than overestimating their likelihood. As unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes (Mellers et al., 1997) , people might strategically overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome as a way of protecting themselves from the intense emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize. Shepperd et al. (2000) showed that such bracing for loss or strategic pessimism increases likelihood judgments of negative but not of positive outcomes.
Such motivated overestimation of the likelihood of undesirable outcomes (also called asymmetric loss function) may well denote an evolutionary principle that allows humans to protect themselves from harm. Not only may people engage in strategic pessimism to lessen the emotional impact should a negative outcome occur, they may also overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes as a self-control mechanism (Weber, 1994) . For example, overestimating the likelihood of getting cancer will increase a smoker's motivation to quit smoking. Thus, pessimism might be generally stronger than optimism.
Even though pessimism may be stronger than optimism in general, there is cumulative evidence that optimism is more prevalent than pessimism. People's default focus is on success, not on failure (cf. Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Gallagher & Lopez, 2009; Goldsmith & Amir, 2008; Matlin & Stang, 1978; Taylor & Brown, 1988) . So, what makes people change from focusing on successes to focusing on failures? One factor is time. People tend to lose confidence in their prospects for success the closer they are to the moment of truth. Gilovich, Kerr, and Medvec (1993) showed that students think they will do better on their midterm exams when asked on the first day of class than when asked on the day of the exam. According to Lewin (1951) and Trope and Liberman (2003) , prospects in the far future are evaluated in terms of desirability. As a person gets closer to the event, the negative aspects tend to increase faster and exert more influence than positive aspects. As a result, prospects in the near future are evaluated in terms of feasibility, that is, in a more critical fashion.
Another factor that is likely to change people's focus is salience. In environments where successes are salient, people evaluate prospects in terms of how likely it is that they will succeed. For example, during economic booms, people focus on how likely they are to make money on the stock market, get a better job, or launch a successful startup. In times of economic recessions, in contrast, failures are more salient. Prospects are evaluated in terms of likelihood of failure, such as how likely it is that one will lose one's retirement in the stock market, lose one's job, or have to close down an ailing business. The stake-likelihood effect would magnify these tendencies. During economic booms, it would cause people to be even more optimistic; during economic recessions, it would cause them to be even more pessimistic. This magnifying effect is in accordance with the observation in economics that people trade too much, more than what would be expected from traditional economic theory (Odean, 1999) .
The magnifying consequence of the stake-likelihood effect might also shed light on why, in research utilizing games of chance, subjective probabilities were found to be insensitive to outcome desirability. According to the stake-likelihood effect, subjective probabilities are affected by outcome desirability, but no difference between likelihood judgments for success and for failure may have been observed because both were increased (relative to likelihood judgments of neutral outcomes).
So, why does the stake-likelihood effect exist? According to the feelings-as-information hypothesis of Schwarz and Clore (1983) , when judgments are difficult to make because objective criteria to allow a precise judgment are lacking, the judgments are made on the basis of how a decision maker feels about the object in question. Arousal can be one of these feelings, as is evidenced by the many arousal misattribution findings (cf. Reisenzein, 1983) . Thus, misattribution of arousal may allow people to efficiently make judgments that, when considered in utter objectivity, would be very difficult and time consuming to make.
However, such judgments are not necessarily accurate. In Study 3, likelihood judgments of the focal outcome were accurate when participants were not aroused but were too high when participants had a stake in the outcome. For the complementary likelihood judgments, the opposite was the case. Because these likelihoods were generally vastly underestimated, arousal from having a stake in the outcome increased likelihood judgments, thereby making them more accurate. Results from Study 2 show a similar pattern. Thus, the stake-likelihood effect can make likelihood judgments more or less accurate depending on how much people tend to underestimate likelihoods when they have no stake in the outcome.
Underestimation of likelihoods is caused by the supportgenerating process in which people engage. According to support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) , when judging the likelihood of an event, people tend to form a global impression that is based primarily on the most representative or available cases rather than unpacking the hypothesis into its exclusive components and adding their support. As the support-generating process is not exhaustive, hypotheses with large extensions (i.e., the number of instances that they entail) receive relatively less support than hypotheses with small extensions. In accordance with this hypothesis, likelihood judgments in Studies 2 and 3 showed that the greater the objective probability of an event was, the more participants underestimated its likelihood.
Of course, decision makers could learn to optimize the accuracy of their judgments, thereby diminishing the impact of the stake-likelihood effect. Such learning is evidenced by the common advice not to make decisions in the heat of the moment but to gain some emotional distance from the decision object to make a more reasonable judgment. Decision makers could also probe their judgments for accuracy. When judging likelihoods, decision makers may want to assess the likelihood of the focal outcome and the likelihood of the complementary outcome to occur. This exercise would force them to calibrate their likelihood judgments to add up to 100%. Furthermore, unpacking a hypothesis (dividing it into smaller subcategories) forces decision makers to more exhaustively consider all possibilities that a hypothesis entails, thereby making complementary likelihood judgments more accurate.
Finally, what are the boundary conditions for misattribution of arousal? When objective criteria are present and a decision maker is able (has the cognitive resources) and willing (is motivated to engage in effortful deliberation) to consider them, arousal is less likely to be misattributed to judgments. When judgments are subjective and difficult to make, judgments are likely to be based on misattributed arousal. However, this will only occur when the arousal-triggering situation/cause is not salient (Reisenzein & Gattinger, 1982) . When people are aware why they are aroused, misattribution of arousal is unlikely. Likewise, mild and moderate arousal tends to be misattributed, but for intense arousal, the arousal source is salient, and consequently, no misattribution occurs (Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001) . This suggests that the stake-likelihood effect is confined to small and medium stakes but will not occur for high stakes.
In the studies reported in this article, the stake-likelihood effect was tested not only by asking respondents to judge the likelihood of success or failure but also by asking them to judge the complementary likelihoods of nonsuccess and nonfailure. Testing both directions of a hypothesis provides the strongest test of a theory. However, it can also provide new insights that might disconfirm a theory. For example, in illusion of control studies, which demonstrate another form of wishful thinking (Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998) , participants are typically asked to judge only the likelihood of success and not the likelihood of failure. It seems as if researchers, like the respondents they study, naturally focus on success but not on failure. However, if, as in the present studies, participants are asked to judge both likelihoods, they may be found to be optimistic and pessimistic. Wishful thinking and positive illusions might thus turn out to be less prevalent than previously assumed (cf. Colvin & Block, 1994; Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007; Vosgerau, Anderson, & Ross, 2008) . This seems to be an exciting avenue for future research.
